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LEAD ARTICLE
FIX AND TELL: THE SOTHEBY'S/CHRISTINE'S
ANTITRUST SCANDAL AND PROPOSED
CHANGES TO ILLINOIS ART AUCTION LAW
Donald R. Simon*
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly 200 years, auction houses like Sotheby's and
Christie's have been the public's gauge for measuring the value of
artwork.' These houses act as agents and guides, offering advice
to sellers and collectors while making money by taking
- 2commissions. Auctions are the most popular methods of buying
and selling art.' Today, some form of auction comprise nearly
fifty percent of transactions involving art.4 Internationally, the
auction industry takes in nearly $4 billion dollars annually.' Of
that amount, Sotheby's and Christie's, the largest and most
influential auction houses,6 control more than ninety percent of the
world's auction business.' Although there are many other auction
* Director, Business and Legal Affairs, Questar, Inc., Chicago, Illinois. J.D.,
June 2002/LL.M. (Intellectual Property) Candidate, June 2003, John Marshall
Law School, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. (Mass Communication) Missouri Southern
State College, Joplin, Missouri. I would like to thank Dr. Peter J. McGovern for
his assistance in the writing of this Article. Special thanks go to my wife
Christine and daughter Emma for their love and support.
1. Alexandra Peers, Secrets and Seurats, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2001, at Bi,
available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2868521.
2. Id.
3. LEONARD D. DUBOFF, ART LAw INA NUTSHELL, 54 (2d ed.1993).
4. Id.
5. Carol Vogel & Ralph Blumenthal, Memos Point to Ties Between Auction
Houses, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at Al.
6. JoHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE
VISUAL ARTS, 761 (Kluwer Law International 1998).
7. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Sotheby's and Former Top
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houses throughout the world, the actions and practices set forth by
these two houses have the greatest influence on the auction
market.'
The art world seems an unlikely place to find a cartel, so when
charges of criminal price-fixing came to light, it sent shockwaves
all the way from the hollowed gallery halls of New York to the
high society drawing rooms of London and beyond. Sotheby's and
Christie's provide essentially the same services to art sellers and
they compete primarily on price, undercutting each other's offers
to sellers.' However, beginning at least as early as April 1993 and
continuing at least until December of 1999,0 the two auction
houses entered into a conspiracy to eliminate competition by fixing
auction commission rates charged to sellers in the United States
and abroad." As a result, sellers lost their bargaining tool. 2 This
agreement entered into by Sotheby's and Christie's was found to
be an unreasonable restrain of interstate and foreign trade and
commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
(hereinafter "Section 1"). "
This Article begins with an outline of the facts surrounding the
antitrust cases against Sotheby's and Christie's. Next, the Article
will give a short explanation of applicable United States and
Executive Agree to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing on Commissions Charged to
Sellers at Auctions (visited Oct. 5, 2000), <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
press releases/2000/6639.htm>.
8. MERRYMAN, supra note 6, at 761.
9. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note7. Each auction house has gained a
reputation for selling different types of merchandise. Anna Rohleder, Which
Auction House Is Right For You?, FORBES.COM (visited Nov. 14, 2001),
<http://www.forbes.com/ 2001/11/14/1114connguide.html.> Sotheby's has a
reputation for doing well with American furniture and photography. Id.
Christie's is best known for selling European furniture, books, and manuscripts.
Id. Both auction houses are known for selling jewelry. Id.
10. Douglas Frantz, Secret Partners: The Unraveling of A Conspiracy,
N.Y.TIMES, (Oct. 8, 2000), <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/
08/business/08AUCT.html>.
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Illinois antitrust statutes. This Article will also analyze the Illinois
Art Auction House Act and the Illinois Auction License Act and
will examine some of the fiduciary and ethical considerations
involved in art auction house transactions, and how antitrust
allegations temper relations between the auction house and the
seller. In addition, this Article will suggest certain modifications
to both the Illinois Art Auction House Act and the Illinois Auction
License Act, in light of the recent auction house antitrust cases, to
provide specific language empowering the Illinois Attorney
General to effectively litigate future auction house breaches of
fiduciary duties and price-fixing conspiracies, and help prevent
auction house cartels in Illinois. These modifications could
provide an example to other states on how to effectively prevent
and restrain similar fiduciary breaches and antitrust concerns in the
art auction industry. Finally, this Article will discuss some of the
after effects of the auction house price-fixing scandal..
II. BACKGROUND
A. Timeline
The Sotheby's/Christie's price-fixing scandal had all the
elements of a cheap crime novel: fine art, high society, backroom
deal making, and finally, justice. The conspiracy centered around
six central players: the two auction houses and four high-ranking
executives. 4 The four executives were: Christopher M. Davidge,.
former president and CEO, and Sir Anthony Tennant, chairman, 5
14. Richard Gruner, Avoiding Fines Through Offense Monitoring, Detection,
and Disclosure: The Race for Amnesty, 1230 PLI/CoRP. 77, 99 (Feb. 2001)
(discussing the Department of Justice's conspirator amnesty program which
Christie's took advantage of to avoid criminal prosecution).
15. Tennant has refused to come to the U.S. to face price-fixing charges.
History of a Conspiracy, BBC News (Dec. 5, 2001),
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1694100.stm>. Tennant cannot be
extradited to the United States because price-fixing in the United Kingdom is
2002]
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both of Christie's, and Diana D. Brooks, and A. Alfred Taubman,
Sotheby's CEO and chairman respectively.6
Beginning as early as April 1993, Davidge began to have
regular, secret meetings with Brooks, his counterpart at
Sotheby's.' 7 According to Department of Justice prosecutors, at
these secret meetings, the conspirators agreed to fix sellers'
commissions, to publish non-negotiable sellers' commission rate
schedules, and in what order each would publish its commission
schedule. 8 The two also agreed to not make interest-free loans on
consignments from sellers, or make charitable contributions as part
of pricing to sellers. 9 This scheme was devised to impair sellers'
ability to achieve the best price terms through negotiation.2"
"Davidge kept written notes regarding both his meetings with
Brooks and his briefings of Tennant concerning these meetings. '"21
Davidge's illegal activities first became known in connection
with his severance package negotiations. 2 By late 1999, Davidge
was being forced out of Christie's23 by Francois Pinault, the
company's new owner. 4 Christie's and Davidge could not agree
merely a civil and not criminal offense. Anna Rohleder, Who's Who in the
Sotheby's Price-Fixing Trial, FORBES.COM (Nov 14, 2001),
<http://www.forbes.com/2001/ 11/14/1114players.html>. However, in the wake
of this price-fixing scandal, the United Kingdom has taken steps toward
criminalizing antitrust violations, which would allow for such extradition. John
Anthony Chavez & Harvey I. Saferstein, International Cartels and Their
Significance to Compliance Programs, 1291 PLU/CoRP. 791, 798 (Feb. 2002).
16. Rohleder, supra note 15.
17. Id.
18. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 7.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Gruner, supra note 14, at 100.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Frantz, supra note 10. Pinault, a wealthy French businessman, bought
Christie's for $1.2 billion dollars. Id. Pinault is one of France's richest men.
Anna Rohleder, Who's Who in the Sotheby's Price-Fixing Trial, supra n. 15. In
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on the terms of his severance package." "Davidge felt the terms of
the package were not sufficiently generous."'26 He had an ace up
his sleeve. "Davidge stuimed company officials by turning over
nearly 500 pages of notes detailing his illegal contacts with
Sotheby's and his briefings of Tennant about these contacts."27
"Upon receipt of Davidge's notes, Christie's executives quickly
recognized the serious misconduct documented" and "the
potentially devastating criminal fines that might result if Christie's
were convicted based on that misconduct."'28
Under the U.S. Department of Justice's (hereinafter "DOJ")
Corporate Leniency Program29 or "fix-and-tell" policy, if a
conspirator confesses before an investigation -gets underway, that
conspirator is afforded automatic amnesty for its illegal activities."
If an investigation is already underway, and a conspirator is the
first to confess, amnesty or partial immunity is at the DOJ's
discretion.3" Christie's officials recognized the merits of amnesty
and the need for quick action to ensure that the company was the
first to confess its sins to prosecutors.32 Absent amnesty, Christie's
would bear serious criminal liability because agents of Christie's,
for the company's benefit, orchestrated the illegal activities.3
"Within a few weeks of their receipt of Davidge's detailed notes,
Christie's officials took these records to federal prosecutors
seeking amnesty for the firm and for Davidge."34
Based on their promise of cooperation in further investigations
of the disclosed misconduct, prosecutors promised Christie's and
Davidge that they would be given conditional immunity.
25. Frantz, supra note 10.
26. Gruner, supra note 14, at 100.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 103.
29. U.S. Department of Justice, supra n. 7.
30. Janet Novak, Fix and Tell, FORBES, May 4, 1998, at 46.
31. Id.
32. Gruner, supra note 14, at 103.
33. Id. at 100-01.
34. Id. at 103.
35. Margaret Mannix, Going, Going, Gone Away, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Mar. 6, 2000, at 43.
2002]
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Individuals associated with Sotheby's however, did not fare so
well.36 In October 2000, Sotheby's pled guilty to Section 1
violations. 7 As part of its plea, Sotheby's agreed to pay a criminal
fine of $45 million over a five-year period.3" Brooks, the first
woman to run a major auction house39 and once considered one of
the most powerful women in the art world," plead guilty in
October 2000 to federal price-fixing conspiracy charges.4 She
agreed to cooperate with the DOJ and testify against Taubman to
avoid a three-year prison term. 2 She would later become the
government's star witness~against her former co-worker. 3
While both auction houses were dealing with criminal antitrust
allegations, the civil suits were getting under way as well. After
an unusual bidding process, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the
Southern District of New York selected David Boies and Richard
B. Drubel of the firm Bois, Schiller and Flexner to represent the
buyers and sellers in the class-action civil suit." This usual
bidding process required law firms to submit sealed bids to the
court detailing the highest settlement they would be willing to
accept on behalf of their clients without deducting attorney's
fees.4" The firms submitted a number for a second settlement for
36. Gruner, supra note 14, at 103.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Larry Neumeister, Sotheby's Admits Ripping Off Clients (July 16, 2001),
<http://www.bergen.com/biz/ soth06200010063.htm>.
40. Brooks, Sotheby's Both Plead Guilty; Christie's and Sotheby's Move to
Settle Civil Suits, MAINE ANTIQUE DIGEST, JULY 16, 2001, at
http://www.maineantiquedigest.com/articles/anti1100.htm.
41. Neumeister, supra note 39.
42. Auction House Trial Nears End, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2001), at
<http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/ national/AP-Auction-House-
Trial.html?searchpv=aponline.
43. See Ralph Blumenthal and Carol Vogel, Price-Fixing at Sotheby's Is
Depicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at D1.
44. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 F.R.D. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (detailing the different methods for selecting lead counsel in a class action
case and the reasons behind using the auction process in this case).
45. Carol Vogel and Ralph Blumenthal, Art Auction Houses Agree to Pay
$512 Million in Price-Fixing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2000, at Al.
[Vol. X11:269
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which the law firm would receive a quarter for their services and
their clients the remaining portion.46 According to Judge Kaplan
the bidding process would maximize the recovery for client while
keeping legal fees down.47
Sotheby's agreed to pay $256 million to settle civil suits arising
out of its price-fixing activities with Christie's.48 Of this amount,
$156 million will come from A. Alfred Taubman.49 Christie's also
agreed to pay $256 million to settle the civil suits against it.5" The
problems for the two embattled auction houses will most likely not
end there. The European Commission announced recently that it is
opening its own anti-competition investigation." Both auction
houses have asked the Commission for leniency. 2
The criminal trial against Taubman began November 8, 2001."3
It was the culmination of a four-year Justice Department
investigation. 4 The two-week trial involved five witnesses called
by the prosecution, including Brooks, and 14 defense witnesses.5
The DOJ's case, based largely in part on the testimony of Brooks,
attempted to portray Taubman as "a devious price fixer" 6 who
46. Id.
47. Id. For an interesting discussion on the selection of lead counsel for class
action lawsuits by auction, see Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block:
Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 650
(Apr. 2002).
48. Gruner, supra note 14, at 103.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Auction Houses Accused of Cartel, BBC NEWs, (Apr. 19, 2002),
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world!
americas/newsid_1939000/1939248.stm>.
52. Peter Cunliffe, EU 'Has Evidence' of Price Fixes at Sotheby's and
Christie's, THE EXPREss, Apr. 20, 2002, at P99, available at 2002 WL
18994208.
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helped scam sellers out of an estimated $400 million. 7 Brooks
testified that Taubman told her that he and Tennant agreed to fix
sellers' commissions because the two auction houses were "killing
each other on the bottom line, and that it was time to do something
about it."58 She also testified that Taubman told her she would
"look good in stripes" when investigators began closing in on their
price-fixing scheme. 9
The defense pounded away at Brooks' credibility"0 while at the
same time portraying her as the true conspirator in the price-fixing
scheme, and Taubman as the silent executive having little to do
with the day-to-day affairs of Sotheby's.6 In reference to her deal
made with prosecutors, defense attorney Robert Fiske stated that
she was "a walking reasonable doubt."62  Michael Curl, a
Sotheby's executive, claimed that Brooks told him, "Alfred
Taubman doesn't run this company-I do." Other defense
witnesses characterized Taubman as a man more interested in
lunch menus than company facts and figures63 and who would
often fall asleep during company board meetings.'
It took the jury less than two days to find Taubman guilty.65
During the sentencing phase, prosecutors asked for a three-year
sentence66 and an $8 million fine.67 Citing his failing health and
substantial charitable and civic work, defense attorneys sought
57. Stevenson Swanson, Ex-Sotheby's Chief Guilty of Bilking Auction
Clients, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 2001, at 1.
58. Id.
59. Art Auction Price Fixing Trial Draws to a Close, supra note 53.
60. Blumenthal, Price-Fixing at Sotheby's is Depicted, supra note 43.
61. Auction House Trial Nears End, supra note 42.
62. Blumenthal, Price-Fixing at Sotheby's is Depicted, supra note 43.
63. Id.
64. Swanson, supra note 57.
65. Id.
66. Ex-Sotheby's Head Gets 1-Year Sentence, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 2002,
available at http://www.chicagotribune. com/business/chi-020422auction.
story?coll=chi2Dbusiness%2Dhed.
67. Jerry Markon, Former Sotheby's Chief Seeks Exemption From Time in
Prison, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at A14, available at 2002 WL 3392386.
276 [Vol. XII:269
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probation.68 Taubman's attorneys also filed letters from a legion of
loyal supporters. 9 Ninety-two letters7" from such distinguished
names as Henry Kissinger,7 Gerald Ford, 72 Queen Noor of
Jordan,73 Brian Mulroney,74 and Barbara Walters7' were filed in
support of leniency for Taubman.76 Walters wrote that Taubman
"is a warm and loving friend, caring and gentle person."77 The
United States Probation Department also asked for leniency and
that Taubman be given no prison time.78
68. Former Head of Sotheby's Sentenced to a Year in Prison, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2002), available at http://vww. nytimes.coml aponline/national/AP-
Auction-Jouse-Sentencing.html.
69. Markon, supra note 67.
70. Joshua Chaffin, Boost for Sotheby's Chief, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002, at
P7, available at 2002 W'L 18767591.
71. "I consider him a man of extraordinary human decency and warmth,"
wrote Mr. Kissinger. Robert Gearty and Dave Goldiner, Feds: Don't Put Art
Scammer in the Slammer, N.Y. DAILY NEWs, Apr. 19, 2002, at 6, available at
2002 WL 19317882.
72. "I trust him as a very honorable friend in every way. He is most reliable.
I am honored to know him," said Gerald Ford in a letter to Judge Daniels.
Letter from Former President Gerald R. Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/18/arts/_19TAUBMAN-
FORD.html.
73. "We sincerely appreciate Alfred's humanitarian generosity and shall long
treasure his friendship," wrote Queen Noor. Letter from Queen Noor ofJordan,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/18/arts/l19TAUBMANNOOR.html.
74. The former Prime Minister of Canada wrote that Taubman "epitomized
for me two of the most remarkable qualities of Americans-a capacity to build
hugely successful careers from scratch and a sense of unsurpassed generosity in
ensuring that a great amount is returned to help others help themselves. " Letter
from Brian Mulroney, Former Prime Minister of Canada, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/18 /arts/_19TAUBMAN-
MULRONEY.htnl.
75. Devlin Barrett, Surprise Leniency 'Bid'. Probation Report Urges No Jail
for Auction Tycoon, N.Y. POST, Apr. 19, 2002, at 5, available at 2002 WL
19328188.
76. Chaffim, supra n. 70.
77. Barrett, supra n. 75.
78. Ralph Blumenthal & Carol Vogel, No Prison Time is Recommended in
Sotheby's Price-Fixing Case, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 19, 2002), available at
2002] 277
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U.S. District Judge George Daniels, after stating that "no one is
above the law," sentenced Taubman to a year and a day. 79 The
extra day allowed the former Sotheby's chairman to be eligible for
time off for good behavior."0 He was also fined $7.5 million."'
Taubman's defense attorneys say they may appeal the verdict. 2
After the trial, defense attorney Fiske said, "[w]e'll review our
options and decide what to do next."3
B. U.S. Antitrust Law: A Primer
Antitrust law's objective is to assure a competitive economy,
based upon the view that through competition consumer needs will
be satisfied at the lowest price with the least amount of sacrifice of
scarce resources. 4 Promoting consumer choice is perhaps the
most important role of antitrust law."5 These combinations of
economic resources are harmful to the public and individuals
because these trusts minimize, if not eliminate competition, and
generate higher prices and lower quality for consumers. 6 In
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/19/arts/design/19SOTH.html.
79. Former Sotheby's Chairman Sentenced in Price-Fixing Case,




82. See Swanson, supra note 57.
83. Id.
84. ERNEST GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS: IN A NUTSHELL,
41 (West 1976).
85. Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62
U. PITT. L. REv. 503, 503 (2001).
86. Id. See also Nat'l. Soc'y. of Prof 1 Eng'r. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978) (discussing the role of competition in the overall quality of goods and
services). It has been held that the Sherman Act:
reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only
lower prices, but also better goods and services ... The assumption that
competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market
recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and
durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free
opportunity to select among alternative offers.
278 [Vol. XII:269
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seeking to create or preserve a climate conducive to a competitive
economy, the antitrust laws rely upon the operation of free
enterprise to decide what shall be produced, how scarce resources
shall be allocated among the various factors of production, and to
whom the various products will be distributed.87
Free enterprise advances the belief that consumers, through their
willingness, will decide what and how much shall be produced and
that competition among producers, with the production of the
highest quality product at the lowest price, will determine who will
manufacture it.88 Ensuring economic freedom for competitors and
consumers has been held to be as important as the preservation of
our personal freedoms.89 Antitrust law has been called the "Magna
Carta 90 of the free enterprise system."
1. The Sherman Act 2
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act93 to prevent
trusts from creating unfair restraints on trade or commerce and
reducing marketplace competition.9" The Sherman Act was
Id.
87. GELLHORN, supra note 84, at 41.
88. Id.
89. JERROLD G. VAN CISE, ET. AL., UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
26 (Practicing Law Institute 1986).
90. See U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (describing the
importance of federal antitrust law). Below the court described the importance
of federal antitrust law:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection
of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster.
Id.
91. VAN CIsE, supra note 89, at 26.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).
93. Id.
94. Legal Information Institute, Law about Antitrust: Overview 2, at
2002]
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enacted to preserve economic liberty, and to eliminate unfair
restraints on trade and economic competition." "The [Sherman
Act] was concrete recognition of the public's interest in controlling
monopoly power, an interest that was not dependent for its
indication in the initiative of private individuals injured directly by
the monopolist's conduct."9 The Sherman Act is still the chief
source of U.S. antitrust law today and most states have similar
statutes.97
Section 1 of the Sherman Act ("Section 1"), reads that: "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."98 With
this broad language, Congress left it to the courts to determine
what types of business behavior would be prohibited under Section
L" Over the years, courts developed two categories of antitrust
analysis: "per se" and "rule of reason."'0 0  Per se offenses are
presumed to be violations of Section 1. 1 Price-fixing, group
boycotts, and certain "tying" arrangements are examples of "per
se" antitrust violations.0 2 There are other business activities for
http://www.law.comell.edu/topics/antitrust .html (accessed July 13, 2001).
95. Id.
96. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1219, 1219 (1988).
97. Legal Information Institute, supra note 94, at TT 2-4.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001). The section reads as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Id.
99. Conrad M. Shumadine & Michael R. Katchmark, Antitrust and the
Media, 679 PLI/PAT 7, 47 (Nov. 2001).
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which anti-competitive behavior is not so clearly defined. 3 For
such situations, courts use the "rule of reason" approach to
ascertain whether the business behavior's pro-competitive benefits
outweigh any anti-competitive effects.'
2. Price-Fixing
Price-fixing involves the collusion between two businesses "for
the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate
commerce. Any such conspiracy to fix prices in unreasonable per
se. °105  "The conspirators establish the price of a product or
103. Id. at 47-8.
104. Id. at 48; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) (discussing the "rule of reason" approach). Justice Brandeis wrote:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the Court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint,
and its effect, actual or probable. The instrument of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose of
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Id. See also Nat'l. Soc'y. of Prof 1. Eng'r., 435 U.S. at 690-92 (stating that the
rule of reason approach attempts to balance the anti-competitive effects of a
restraint on trade against its pro-competitive benefits to determine its impact on
competition).
105. See Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705,
720 (1964). The Supreme Court has said that the Sherman Act's prohibition of
any agreement to restrain trade prohibits only those agreements which
unreasonably restrain trade. See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 723 (1988) (citing Nat'l. Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984)); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221
U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911). However, there are certain kinds of agreements which
will so often prove so harmful to competition and are so rarely justifiable that
antitrust law does not require proof that an agreement of that kind is, in fact,
anticompetitive. See also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997);
2002]
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service, rather than allowing it to be determined naturally by free
market forces."'' 6  Agreements fixing prices violate federal
antitrust law.
07
"Price-fixing is a serious crime, and I firmly believe that it
inflicts a whole lot of harm on consumers," says Stephen Calkins,
a law professor at Wayne State University and antitrust law
expert.' 8 "Price-fixing is one of the few felonies you can commit
over coffee and bagels."'0 9 Where competitors agree to sell their
goods or services at a specified price, minimum price or maximum
price and they receive profits from such an agreement, they are in
violation of price-fixing."0 These agreements are a primary
concern of Section 1."' Price-fixing is an area of antitrust law that
has criminal penalties as well as civil."2
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 289-290 (1985). This kind of an agreement is illegal per se. See also
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (finding
horizontal price-fixing agreement per se illegal).
106. Price Fixing <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pricefixing.asp>
(July 16, 2001).
107. RONALD A. ANDERSON, ET AL., BusINESS LAW, 70 (South-Western
Publishing 1992).
108. John Gallagher, Antitrust Cases Aim at Helping Consumers, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (May 5, 2001) available at
http://www.freep.com/moneylbusiness/taub5_20010505.htm.
109. Antitrust Course on Bid Rigging, Price Fixing, and Fair Competition
(July 16, 2001), at http://www.integrity-nteractive.com/marketinghmktpg7.htm.
110. What is Price Fixing?, at http://www.business-
law. freeadvice.com/trade-regulation/ price fixing.htm (July 16; 2001).
111. GELLHORN, supra note 84, at 167.
112. John Gallagher, Antitrust Cases Aim at Helping Consumers, DETROIT
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C. Relevant Illinois Statutes
1. ilinois Antitrust Act'
In addition to federal antitrust law, many states have similar
statutes prohibiting price-fixing conspiracies and other acts
protecting local free trade."4  In Illinois, the State Attorney
General may prosecute anyone who shall:
[m]ake any contract with, or engage in any combination or
conspiracy with, any other person who is, or but for a prior
agreement would be, a competitor of such person:" 5 for the
purpose or with the effect of fixing, controlling, or maintaining the
price or rate charged for any commodity sold or bought by the
parties thereto, or the fee charged or paid for any service
performed or received by the parties thereto[.]'" 
6
The Illinois Attorney General may bring suspected violators of
the above section into Circuit Court."7 The court may then, at its
discretion, issue an injunction, dissolve the corporation or
association, and suspend or stop out-of-state corporations from
doing business within the State of Illinois."8 Violations of the
Illinois Antitrust Act are a class 4 felony with fines of no more than
$1,000,000 for a corporation, and no more than $100,000 for an
individual."9 The Illinois Attorney General may not commence
any antitrust action upon a defendant if that defendant is currently
under federal antitrust indictment. 
20
113. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10 (2001).
114. Legal Information Institute, Antitrust, supra note 94.
115. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/3 (2001).
116. Id. at § 10/3 (1)(a).
117. Id. at § 10/7(1) (2001).
118. Id.
119. Id. at § 10/6 (2001).
120. Id. at. § 10/6(3) (2001).
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2. Illinois Art Auction House Act' 2'
The state has enacted a statute designed specifically for auction
houses that act as agents for the sale of fine art, jewelry, antiques,
etc.'22 The Illinois Art House Auction Act orders all art auction
houses to establish and maintain separate bank accounts for
monies made on behalf of sellers for whom the auction house has
acted as an agent for the sale of art, antiques, furnishings, etc.'23 In
addition, the art auction houses and auctioneers must file affidavits
with the state naming the bank in which they deposit sellers' funds
from auction sales. 124 Violations of the Illinois Art House Auction
Act are a class 4 felony, punishable by a fine of $25,000 or more. 
125
121. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405 (2001). The Illinois Art House Auction Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. As used in this Act, art auction house means any person, partnership,
corporation, association or group engaged for profit primarily in the business of
conducting auctions at which it acts as agent for any seller of works of art,
antiques, fumishings, jewelry, gemstones, coins, stamps and rare books and
manuscripts.
Sec. 2. Every art auction house shall establish and maintain a separate account
in an Illinois bank or savings and loan association for customer funds and shall
notify each customer of the identity of such bank or savings and loan
association. Upon its receipt of proceeds from an auction, it shall segregate and
deposit the proceeds due sellers into the separate account established and
maintained for sellers for whom the art auction house has acted as agent until
the funds are disbursed to the sellers. Funds shall be disbursed to the sellers
within 30 days of their receipt.
See. 3. Every art auction house shall annually register and file with the
Secretary of State, on forms provided by that office, a statement declaring the
bank or savings and loan association in which it maintains a separate account for
customer funds.
Sec. 4. Any person who knowingly violates any provision of this Act shall be
guilty of a Class 4 felony, punishable by a fine of not less than $25,000.
Id.
122. Id. at § 405/1 (2001).
123. Id. at § 405/2.
124. Id. at § 405/3.
125. Id. at § 405/4.
[Vol. XII:269284
16
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol12/iss2/2
2002] FIXAND TELL 285
3. illinois Auction License Act 26
The Illinois Auction License Act regulates the obligations and
126, 225 ILL COMP. STAT. § 407 (2001). The Illinois Auction License Act is
as follows:
Sec. 15-5. Representations. An auctioneer, associate auctioneer, or auction
firm or the sponsored licensees, agents, or employees of an auctioneer or
auction fin, conducting an auction or providing an auction service shall not:
(1) misrepresent a fact material to a purchaser's decision to buy at or by
auction;
(2) predict specific or immediate increases in the value of any item offered for
sale at auction; or
(3) materially misrepresent the qualities or characteristics of any item offered
for sale at auction.
Sec. 15-10.Auction contract. Any auctioneer, associate auctioneer, or auction
firm shall not conduct an auction or provide an auction service, unless the
auctioneer, associate auctioneer, or auction firm enters into a written or oral
auction contract with the seller of any property at auction prior to the date of the
auction. The agreement shall be signed by the auctioneer, associate auctioneer,
or auction firm conducting an auction or providing an auction service and the
seller or sellers, or the legal agent of the seller or sellers of the property to be
offered at or by auction, and shall include, but not be limited to the following
disclosures:
(1) Licensees shall disclose:
(A) the name, license number, business address, and phone number of the
auctioneer, associate auctioneer, or auction firm conducting an auction or
providing an auction service;
(3)the fee to be paid to the auctioneer, associate auctioneer, or
auction firm for conducting an auction or providing an auction service; and
(C)an estimate of the advertising costs that shall be paid by the seller
or sellers of property at auction and a disclosure that, if the actual advertising
costs exceeds 120% of the estimated advertising cost, the auctioneer,
associate auctioneer, or auction firm shall pay the advertising costs that
exceed 120% of the estimated advertising costs or shall have the seller or
sellers agree in writing to pay for the actual advertising costs in excess of
120% of the estimated advertising costs.
(2) Sellers shall disclose:
(A) the name, address, and phone number of the seller or sellers or the legal
agent of the seller or sellers of property to be sold at auction; and
(3) any mortgage, lien, or encumbrance of which the seller has knowledge on
any property or goods to be sold or leased at or by auction.
Sec. 15-15. Supervisory duties. The sponsoring auctioneer, auction firm, and
17
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duties of auction houses and auctioneers towards buyers. 1 7  One
who provides auction services may not misrepresent the quality or
important facts behind sale items.12 The Illinois Auction License
Act also requires auction service providers to obtain a contract,
either written or oral, regarding what merchandise will be sold
29
and what fee the auction service provider will be paid. 30 Finally,
the Illinois Auction License Act restricts certain auction services to
licensed auction professionals only.' 3'
managing auctioneer shall have the duty and responsibility to supervise,
manage, and control any sponsored licensee, agent, or employee while
conducting an auction or providing an auction service. Any violation of this Act
by a sponsored licensee, agent, or employee of a sponsoring auctioneer, auction
firm, or managing auctioneer shall be deemed to be a violation by the
sponsoring auctioneer, auction firm, or managing auctioneer as well as by the
sponsored licensee, agent, or employee.
Sec. 15-20. Associate auctioneer. An associate auctioneer shall not conduct an
auction or provide an auction service without the proper supervision of a
licensed auctioneer or receive compensation for conducting an auction other
than from a licensed auctioneer or.auction firm. An associate auctioneer shall
not work for or receive compensation from another auctioneer or an auction
firm other than his or her sponsoring auctioneer or sponsoring auction firm
without the written consent of his or her sponsoring auctioneer or sponsoring
auction firm. The sponsoring auctioneer or sponsoring auction firm and
managing auctioneer shall be responsible for the actions of any sponsored
associate auctioneer while conducting an auction or providing an auction
service.
Sec. 15-25. Auction firm. No corporation, limited liability company, or
partnership shall be licensed without being managed by a licensed auctioneer.
The managing auctioneer of any auction finm shall be responsible for the actions
of all licensed and unlicensed employees, agents, and representatives of said
auction firm while the firm is conducting an auction or providing an auction
service.
Id.
127. See generally id.
128. Id. at § 407/15-5.
129. Id. at § 407/15-10.
130. Id. at § 407/15-10(l)(B).
131. SeeId. at §§ 407/15-15, 20, 25.
18




A. Proposed Changes to fiinois Auction Law
Laws regulating auction houses and auctioneers have developed
from the basic societal values of honesty, fairness, and
efficiency--attributes that all auctions and auctioneers should
possess. In order to make informed business decisions, the fall
and complete disclosure of facts and observations is necessary
between the parties.'33 In the art world, most deals are ratified by
oral contracts and sealed with handshakes. Trust binds the art
industry together, and an auctioneer or art dealer has nothing if he
or she has a bad reputation. For those reasons, the art auction
industry has a unique duty to uphold the interests not only of the
buyers, sellers, and artists, but also of the public in order to
safeguard the integrity of the art industry.
Auction houses and auctioneers have been endowed with a
"public function, "134 that is, they should engage in business
practices with an eye toward protecting the public interest. Courts
have held that auction houses and auctioneers are more than just
agents of buyers and sellers, but in some sense, they are also
public servants.'35 To a certain extent, auction houses have
accepted this public service function voluntarily by offering tours,
traveling exhibits, and lectures-the primary functions of public
132. Jorge Contreras, The Art Auctioneer: Duties and Assumptions, 13
HASTINGS COMM & ENT. L.J. 717, 720 (1991).
133. Id. at 723.
134. Id. at 737.
135. Id. See, e.g., Biddies, Inc. v. Enright, 239 N.Y. 354, 365, 146 N.E. 625,
629 (1925). "The business of an auctioneer... has always been affected by a
public interest and subject to legislative restriction." Id. See also Veazie v.
Williams, 49 U.S. 134, 154 (1850). "Any fraud by auctioneers is more
dangerous than by owners themselves. The sales through the former extend to
many millions annually, and are distributed through the whole country.. ." Id.
See also Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Assn., 759 P.2d 418, 423 (Wash.
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museums. 136  So, when Sotheby's and Christie's conspired to
eliminate competition by fixing sellers'auction commissions37 and
other illegal activities, they did more than just violate federal
antitrust law, cost themselves and hundreds of people millions of
dollars, and lower their own reputations; these auction houses
violated a sacred public trust.
There is little federal auction law.138 However, the states, under
their police powers, may regulate auctions, auction houses, and
the licensing of auctioneers. 139 "It has been said that the business
of conducting auctions is one that requires public supervision so
that purchasers will not be imposed on or the owners of property
sold at auction are not defrauded, and the state, in the exercise of
its police power, may limit or qualify the right to be an auctioneer,
or engage in the business of an auctioneer. ",140 In addition, the
states may reasonably impose restrictions on auction sales with
respect to the time and place they are held and what goods may be
sold. 141
Both Sotheby's and Christie's have salesrooms and auction
representatives scattered throughout the United States4 and as
such, each location subjects itself to the particular auction laws
promulgated in each state and municipality. In light of the recent
price-fixing investigations at Sotheby's and Christie's, a serious
look at Illinois 'auction law should be undertaken to see whether
any modifications should be made to existing statutes. The
following suggested modifications should be enacted for the
purpose of strengthening state control of auction practices,
protecting individuals on all sides of the auction transaction,
136. Contreras, supra note 132, at 738.
137. Department of Justice, supra note 7.
138. See, e.g. FederalAnimal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq.
139. 7 Am. Jur. 2dAuctions and Auctioneers § 3 (1997).
140. Id.
141. Id. at § 6.
142. See, e.g., Sotheby.Com-International Offices, at
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preventing future antitrust violations, and finally, and most
importantly, safeguarding the public interest. Below are
suggestions aimed at achieving these goals.
1. illinois Art Auction House Act 45
The main thrust of the Art Auction House Act is that art auction
houses and auctioneers who act as agents for the sale of "works of
art, antiques, furnishings, jewelry, gemstones, coins, stamps and
rare books and manuscripts"'4 must maintain separate bank
accounts for the deposit of proceeds from art auctions. 145 Another
section of the Illinois Art Auction House Act requires each
auction house and auctioneer to file an annual statement with the
state naming the financial institution in which the sellers'funds
are deposited. 146 Any violation of the Illinois Art Auction House
Act is a Class 4felony with afine not less than $25, 000.'47
Art auctions involve the dispersal of culture. Auction houses
like Sotheby's and Christie's have developed special expertise in
the evaluation and sale of cultural property 48 and thus should be
held to a higher standard than a typical auction house or auctioneer
who deals mainly in farm implements or used automobiles.
Accordingly, language should be added to the Illinois Art Auction
House Act that would require auction businesses who wish to
specialize in art sales to obtain a state license for that specific
purpose. The Illinois Art Auction House Act should also impose
penalties on auction houses and auctioneers who violate their
fiduciary duties to sellers. The legislature could perhaps add the
following language to the Illinois Art Auction House Act: "Any art
auction house licensed and recognized as an expert in a particular
area of cultural property sales shall not, in the context of an
143. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405 (2001). For the complete proposed Illinois
Art House Auction Act, consult infra Appendix 1.
144. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/1 (2001).
145. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/2 (2001).
146. See Id. at § 405/3.
147. See Id. at § 405/4.
148. Contreras, supra note 132, at 725.
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auction, misrepresent the material facts behind, the history,
quality, or marketability of any type of merchandise set for in §
405/1 to any seller or buyer." Penalties should include the
termination of the offending auction house's or auctioneer's
business license.
Another suggested modification of the Illinois Art House
Auction Act is directly influenced by the Sotheby's and Christie's
antitrust scandal. The legislature should adopt language similar to
the following to safeguard against illegal collusion between
auction houses or between auctioneers: "Any licensed art auction
house shall not contract, conspire, or otherwise agree to fix the
commission or commissions of any seller or sellers, with whom
they deal, with a competing art auction house, the sum of whom
make up a significant share of the art auction market." The
Illinois Antitrust Act'49 most likely covers these types of illegal
conspiracies, including those perpetrated by auction houses and
auctioneers. 5 ° However, when the integrity of the art auction
process is at stake, placing this additional language in the Illinois
Art House Auction Act, as superfluous as it may be, confirms the
state's intolerance of these illegal activities and it's belief in the
public interest function of auction houses and auctioneers.
Finally, the Illinois Art House Auction Act's penalty provision'
should be modified to include possible suspension or termination
of a violator's art auction license plus applicable criminal and civil
liabilities. "Any person, auction house, or art auction house who
knowingly violates any provision of this Act shall be guilty of a
Class 4 felony, punishable by a fine of not less than $25,000,
and/or the suspension or termination of the Illinois art auction
house license and/or the Illinois auction license, plus all
applicable federal and state criminal and civil penalties."
149. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/3(l)(a) (2001).
150. See generally id.
151. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/4 (2001).
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2. Illinois Auction License Ac' 2
The primary purpose of the Illinois Auction License Act is to
regulate the duties and obligations of auction houses and
auctioneers towards buyers.'53 In a manner similar to any typical
consumer protection statute, buyers are protected from
misrepresentations of the facts behind, or the current quality of,
any item for sale at an auction. 54 As the statute now stands, the
only obligations an auction house or auctioneer has toward a seller
is to ensure that a contract, either written or oral, is formed
detailing, among other things, what property is to be sold at the
auction, the license number of the auctioneer, and the business
address of the auction service.155
The most clearly defined duties of any auction house or
auctioneer are the obligations owed to the seller of goods.'56 An
auction house or auctioneer who receives items for sale at auction
forms an agency relationship with the seller for all matters in
relation to the auction.'57 This agency relationship includes the
fiduciary duties of good faith, honesty, and the utmost loyalty in
all matters relating to the agency.' An auction house or
auctioneer has an affirmative duty to use reasonable efforts to
communicate to the seller "all material facts" that he/she is aware
152. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 407 (2001). For the complete proposed Illinois
Auction License Act, consult infra Appendix 2.
153. See generally 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 407 (2001).
154. Id. at § 407/15-5.
155. Id. at § 407/15-10.
156. Contreras, supra note 132, at 723.
157. Id.
158. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 210 (1986). See also Wadsworth v. Adams,
138 U.S. 380, 389 (1890) (stating that a principal "is entitled... to the benefit
of diligence, zeal, and disinterested exertions of the agent in the execution of his
employment. The law requires the strictest good faith upon the part of one
occupying a relationship of confidence to another'). See also Cristallina v.
Christie, Manson & Woods Int'l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 172 (1986) (stating
that the agent's duty is to "use his best efforts to promote the principal's
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of regarding the subject matter of the auction and also "all material
facts" that might affect the seller's interests.5 9 If an auctioneer
withholds information about the value of artwork from the seller,
the seller may not know what price to expect for the work.'60
When Sotheby's and Christie's agreed to fix the commissions paid
to sellers, it was not only a violation of federal and state antitrust
law for them to do so, but an egregious breach of fiduciary duties
as well.
In modifying the Illinois Auction License Act, the legislature
should add language that reflects the unique character and nature
of the auction fiduciary relationship, language that would protect
not only buyers but also sellers from deliberate misrepresentations
by auction houses and auctioneers. For example, in the
"Representations" section of the Illinois Auction Act,16" ' there
should be language added that prohibits misrepresentations made
by the auction house or auctioneer to the seller. Perhaps the
legislature could add: "An auctioneer, associate auctioneer, or
auction firm or the sponsored licensees, agents, or employees of an
auctioneer or auction firm, conducting an auction or providing an
auction service shall not: 62 (4) misrepresent any material fact or
facts regarding the subject matter of an auction and that might
affect the seller's interests." As mentioned earlier, when an
auction house or auctioneer and a seller enter into an agreement to
sell real or personal property, they enter into an agency
relationship and as a result, certain fiduciary duties arise.'63 The
above proposed language emphasizes the importance of protecting
the integrity of the fiduciary relationship between the seller and the
auction house or auctioneer.
Perhaps the legislature could add the following to the "Auction
Contract" section"6 in relation to the unique nature of the art house
auction: "The agreement shall be signed by the auctioneer,
159. 3 Am. Jur. 2dAgency § 211 (1986).
160. Contreras, supra note 132, at 726.
161. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 407/15-5 (2001).
162. Id.
163. 3 Am. Jur. 2dAgency § 210 (1986).
164. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 407/15-10 (2001).
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associate auctioneer, or auction firm conducting an auction... and
the seller or sellers.., shall include.., the following
disclosures: 6 ' (D) the agreed upon amount constituting the seller 's
commission on the sale of merchandise by auction."
Understanding that most art deals are secured by handshakes stills
leaves open the risk of error or-bad faith dealings by one or both
parties. Committing auction houses, auctioneers, and sellers to an
agreed upon and documented commission structure safeguards the
economic interests of the seller or sellers and protects auction
houses and auctioneers from unnecessary liability and perhaps
costly damage to their reputations.
Finally, in order to give the illinois Auction License Act more
force and demonstrate the state's intolerance of any illegal activity
perpetrated by and between auction houses and auctioneers, the
legislature should consider adding a penalties provision. In similar
fashion to the current penalties provision of the Illinois Art Auction
House Act,'66 the legislature should consider any violation of the
Illinois Auction License Act a felony, perhaps class 4, and make
any violation punishable by a fine not less than $25,000. The
legislature should also consider allowing the Illinois Attorney
General the ability to seek the suspension or termination of an
auction house's or auctioneer's business license for particularly
flagrant offenses.
B. Effect on the Art Auction World
The bad publicity surrounding the price-fixing scandal could
open doors for competitors.' 7 People "will probably be more open
to working with other auction galleries," says Kathleen Doyle,
chairperson CEO of William Doyle Galleries in New York.' 8
"Our business, we feel, will only grow."'69 Another auction house
hoping to capitalize on Sotheby's and Christie's legal woes is
165. Id.
166. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/3 (2001).
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Phillips.17° Works that probably would have gone to Sotheby's or
Christie's have now been coming to Phillips. 7 ' In 2001 alone,
Phillips landed the sale of seven Cezannes and Van Goghs worth
an estimated $80 million, as well as four other works by Renoir,
Monet, Matisse, and Modigliani. 2
Recognizing the damage this scandal has had to the reputation of
his corporation and the integrity of the art auction process, William
F. Ruprecht, who became CEO of Sotheby's after the resignation
of Diana D. Brooks, issued the following statement after Brooks's
guilty plea:
On behalf of Sotheby's, I apologize to our clients for this breach
of the standards of trust that they have the right to expect from us
and assure them that no member of Sotheby's current management
played any role whatsoever in these events or was aware at
anytime that they were taking place. We are committed to
ensuring that our business is conducted according to the highest
principles of honesty and integrity.'
How will an industry, where most deals are sealed with smiles
and handshakes, where trust is the cornerstone of the industry, ever
recover from this scandal? "People have come to distrust the
authority of the auction houses," says Robert Simon, former
president of the Appraisers Association of America. 74 However,
auction house insiders discount any long-term damage to the
reputations of Sotheby's and Christie's.'75 "This is the way people
have done business for centuries," says Karen Keane of Skinner, a
Boston-based auction house, "the scandal might cast a shadow, but
it's not going to end the auction business as we know it."' 76 Only
time will tell if this scandal will change the way buyers, sellers,
auction houses and auctioneers do business. However, if one were




173. Brooks, Sotheby's Both Plead Guilt, supra note 40.
174. Peers, supra note 1.
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to venture a guess, it probably will not. The art industry has been
around for about as long as art itself and old customs are hard to
break. Sotheby's and Christie's have been in business for a long
time and weathered storms before; there is no reason to think that
both will not be around for another 200 years.
IV. CONCLUSION
For over two centuries, Sotheby's and Christie's have been the
public's gauge for measuring the value of artwork.' Trust binds
the art industry together, and an auctioneer or art dealer has
nothing if he or she has a bad reputation. For those reasons, the art
auction industry has a unique duty to not only uphold the interests
of the buyers, sellers, and artists, but also the general public, in
order to uphold the integrity of the art industry. So when
Sotheby's and Christie's participated in a "quiet cartel" to
eliminate competition by fixing sellers' auction commissions'78
and other illegal activities, they did more than just violate federal
and state antitrust law, cost themselves and hundreds of people
millions of dollars, and lower their own reputations, these auction
houses house violated a public trust.
A serious review of Illinois auction law reveals several changes
that should be implemented in light of the Sotheby's and Christie's
antitrust cases. Many of the suggested provisions for the Illinois
Art Auction House Act and the illinois Auction License Act may be
covered by other state or federal statutes,'79 however, placing these
provisions in the auction laws ensures that there will be no mistake
as to the obligations and duties auction houses and auctioneers
owe to sellers.
For the Illinois Art House Auction Act, the state legislature
should consider adding language to the statute which penalizes an
auctioneer or auction house who knowingly misrepresents the
history or value of an item of cultural property. In addition, the
177. Peers, supra note 1.
178. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 7.
179. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10 (2001).
2002] 295
27
Simon: Fix and Tell: The Sotheby's/Christine's Antitrust Scandal and Pro
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ ART. & ENT. LAW
statute should reflect the state's intolerance for unfair price
collusion. Another change involves adding specific language to
the Illinois Auction License Act to protect sellers from
misrepresentations that might affect the seller's interests. Other
proposed changes include adding language to require
documentation concerning the seller's commission and penalties
for violations of the Illinois Auction License Act up to and
including the suspension or termination of an auction house's or
auctioneer's license.
The Sotheby's and Christie's antitrust cases shine light on a
quiet industry. An industry that is often "a closed shop" and where
deals are sealed with handshakes-just as it has been for hundreds
of years. Current Illinois auction law primarily protects the rights
of buyers. This is a shortcoming. State auction law should be
modified to impose penalties for breaches of obligations to sellers
as well. The seller is, after all, just as important to any auction
transaction as the buyer.
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